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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals to
hear this appeal by Section 78-2a-3(j), U.C.A. 1953, as amended
(cases transferred from to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court)•
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are whether or not the lower
court erred in (1) failing to consider parol evidence after finding
as a matter of law that the parties1 April 22, 1983 letter agreement contained obvious and admitted ambiguities; (2) determining
as a matter of law that the subject agreement was not to be
considered a brokerage agreement because there was no real property
involved in *the transaction entitling plaintiff to an agreed
commission

upon performance; or

(3) failing

to

recognize

a

condition precedent in the May 31, 1984 release agreement between
the parties which had not been satisfied.
The standard of review when considering a challenge to summary
judgment is well settled.

In reviewing a grant of summary judg-

ment, the appellate court analyzes the facts and inferences to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party.
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Natfl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
Since summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the Court
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness.

Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law
which is reviewed on appeal for correctness.

Jarman v. Reagan

Outdoor Advertising, 794 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1990).

If a trial

court interprets a contract as a matter of law, that interpretation
is not afforded any particular deference on appeal. Power Systems
& Controls, Inc. v. Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah
App. 1988).

If the contract is ambiguous, but th^ case is decided

on summary judgment, the appellate court can affirm only if the
undisputed

material

facts

concerning

the

parties1

intent

demonstrate that the successful litigant's position is correct as
a matter of law.

Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt

Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989).
In cases involving the interpretation of a document or an
agreement, it is improper for a lower court considering summary
judgment to weigh disputed evidence concerning its meaning; the
sole inquiry is whether a genuine issue of material fact is
presented. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Min., Inc. , 740 P.2d 1304,
1307 (Utah 1987).

Only one sworn statement is required to dispute

averments on the other side of the controversy and create issues
of fact precluding summary judgment.
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).

2

Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for breach of contract to pay a commission
which was commenced on September 12, 1985. Before trial, defendant
submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal to the
Honorable

Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, which motion

the

District Court granted for the reason that the court considered the
written agreement of the parties insufficiently clear to stand as
a contractual agreement entitling appellant to the payment of a
commission.
that

the

The District Court acknowledged in its bench ruling

language

and

legibility

of

the parties1

agreement

presented ambiguities which made it difficult to determine the
parties' intent.
The court further noted in its bench ruling that a "Form A"
filing of defendant with the North Dakota Insurance Department
which was made for the purpose of obtaining approval of the subject
acquisition also contained an ambiguity concerning the matter of
a commission.

The court refused to consider parol evidence which

was available in the record to resolve either or both ambiguities
which the court found to exist.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about April 22, 1983, a letter was directed to

Appellant by Defendant Quist as president of S.N.L. Financial
(S.N.L.), which set forth certain conditions including a price,

3

terms, and exchange properties which defendant S.N.L. Financial was
willing to give in exchange for one David B. Johnson's stock
holdings in Security International Company (SIC), a North Dakota
corporation, the assets of which included as a wholly owned
subsidiary Security International Insurance Company

(SIIC), a

domestic North Dakota life insurer.
2.

The subject letter of April 22, 1983 provides under item

six (6) for a "$200,000.00 annuity", without further explanation.
Parol evidence in the record, if considered, would establish that
the annuity was a consideration to be paid appellant by S.N.L. as
an agreed commission for bringing S.N.L. Financial as buyer and
David B. Johnson as seller together on mutually agreeable terms.
[Deposition of David B. Johnson, 24:5, Addendum, Exhibit

6;

Affidavit of Giles H. Florence, Addendum, Exhibit 4]
3.

On or about May 19, 19S3, a definitive agreement was

executed between S.N.L. as buyer and David B. Johnson as seller
which set forth the detailed terms and conditions of the transaction, after the parties had been brought together by and the
agreed terms had been negotiated through the appellant. The terms
included real property and security interests in real property as
partial consideration. [George Quist depo., 8:23-9:11, Addendum,
Exhibit 5]

4

4.

On

or

about

September

28, 1983, defendant

S.N.L.

Financial filed with the Insurance Department of North Dakota a
"Form A" document entitled "Statement Regarding the Acquisition of
Control of a Domestic Insurer," setting forth the agreed terms for
its purchase of Security International Corporation ("SIC") and its
wholly owned subsidiary, Security International Insurance Company
(SIIC) from David B. Johnson-

[Deposition of George R. Quist,

Addendum, Exhibit 5]
5.

Defendant's "Form A" filing acknowledged a commission or

finder's fee obligation to be paid appellant [George Quist Depo.
pg. 24; Form "A", Addendum, Exhibit 7], which provision the trial
court determined to be unclear and ambiguous- [Tr. Bench Ruling,
Addendum, Exhibit 1, pg. 45]
6-

The Boards of Directors of SIC, Security Holding, and

S.N.L. Financial Group each by resolution unanimously approved the
agreed transaction, and regulatory approval of the North Dakota
Department of Insurance was obtained for the acquisition upon those
agreed terms during the month of October 1983. [Affidavit of Giles
Florence, Addendum, Exhibit 4]
7*

Defendants' letter agreement to appellant dated April

22, 1983, specified certain conditions to be satisfied before the
$200,000.00 annuity would become payable. All of those conditions
had been satisfied by the time the parties met for closing at

5

Fargo, North Dakota on or about May 31, 1984. [Affidavit of Giles
Florence, Addendum, Exhibit 4; Johnson depo., pg. 60, Addendum,
Exhibit 6]
8.

At the time of closing, defendant Quist acting in his

capacity as an officer of defendant S.N.L. unexpectedly refused to
close according to the parties' agreement, the boards1 approval,
and the regulatory approval which had been given; and imposed new
terms which were unacceptable to Mr. Johnson.
exchange

accordingly

failed.

The sale and

[Florence Affidavit, Addendum,

Exhibit 4; Johnson depo., pgs. 53-64, Addendum, Exhibit 6]
9.

Before trial, defendants submitted a Motion for Summary

Judgment of Dismissal to the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District
Judge, which motion the District Court granted for the reasons more
fully discussed below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
The trial court determined as a matter of law that the April
22, 1983 letter agreement was ambiguous and unclear as to its
meaning.

The court could not make out the language contained in

the critical paragraph number six

(6) which provided

"$200,000 annuity", without further explanation.

for a

The document is

unclear concerning who was to receive the annuity, when, and for
what.

Appellant maintains that the annuity was agreed to be paid

6

to him as a commission for his brokerage services.

No other or

better explanation has been offered for its existence*

The trial

court determined that the language of paragraph 6 was ambiguous;
but failed to consider available parol or extrinsic evidence to
determine its meaning.
POINT II.
The trial court erred in ruling that the April 22, 1983 letter
agreement did not meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
The Statute of Frauds, 25-5-4 U.C.A., 1953 as amended1, provides
that

lf

[e]very agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or

some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party to be charged therewith."

The Statute of Frauds does not

require that the "note or memorandum" be clear or unambiguous, but
only that it exist. For the trial court to conclude as it did that
the written agreement did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds because
its meaning was unclear to the court is manifest error.
POINT III.
The trial court determined that the letter agreement of April
22, 1983, did not amount to a "brokerage" agreement because it was

1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, rewrote the
beginning of the section and made minor stylistic changes. The
pre-1989 amendment should apply to this case.
Section 68-3-3
U.C.A. (1986) provides that "[n]o part of these revised statutes
is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." See also Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988).

7

unclear and there was no "real property" involved in the transaction.

The letter agreement identified certain real property

which was to be exchanged in the transaction, and a brokerage
agreement need not involve real property at alle

The trial court

erred by ignoring the fact that real property was involved, and in
applying an interpretation of the term "broker" which makes it
applicable only to real property transactions.

Appellant was

clearly acting as a "broker" from a legal standpoint.
POINT IV.
The trial court erred in considering the effect of the
parties1 subsequent May 31, 1984 agreement, which contained an
unsatisfied

condition

precedent;

specifically

the

unobtained

approval of a third party. Appellant contends that the trial court
failed to consider the entire transaction and both agreements as
a whole in order to determine the parties1 intent, once the court
determined that ambiguity existed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT IS EITHER
A QUESTION OF LAW OR A QUESTION OF FACT
The interpretation of a contract is either a question of law,
which is to be determined by the words of the agreement; or a
question of fact to be determined by considering extrinsic evidence

8

concerning the parties1 intent.

Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v.

Heriford, 772 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1989); Kimball v. Campbell, 699
P. 2d 714 (Utah 1985).

A determination of ambiguity must be made

before the court will consider parol or extrinsic evidence of the
parties1 intent.

Once an ambiguity is found to exist, available

extrinsic evidence is admissible and must be considered.
The language in a written document is considered ambiguous if
the words used in the contract may be understood to support two or
more plausible meanings. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 131 Utah Adv.
Rep. 28, 31 (Ct.App. 1990).
A*

THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THE APRIL 22, 1983 AGREEMENT
TO BE AMBIGUOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW

The Utah Supreme Court in Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d
1292 (Utah 1983), held:
[w]hen a contract is ambiguous, because of uncertain
meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies, parol evidence is admissible to explain the
parties' intent.2
Whether an ambiguity exists is a
question of law to be decided before parol evidence may
be admitted. As this court stated in Big Butte Ranch,
Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977):
[T]he court should first examine the language
of the instruments and accord to it the weight
and effect which it may show was intended and
if the meaning is ambiguous or uncertain then
consider parol evidence of the parties'
intentions.

Grow v, Marwick Development, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah
1980).
9

Of course^ a motion for summary judgment may
not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached
that an ambiguity exists in the contract and
there is a factual issue as to what the parties
intended. (Emphasis added) Id, at 691.
Ironically, the trial court in this case made a legal conclusion that ambiguity existed and then granted summary judgment
because of the ambiguity, without any attempt to resolve it by
considering available extrinsic evidence or allowing the question
to be decided by a jury.

Referring to the $200,000.00 annuity

provision, the trial court stated in its bench ruling [Addendum,
Exhibit 1 ] :
....I could not make it all out (page 45)
....it does not spell out anything really as far as the
terms (page 46)
....But this one just does not even get to the heart of
it as far as indicating what is going to be done as far
as the payment of a finders, a brokerage fee (Page 46)
.... I am not persuaded that either the wording in
paragraph 6 or the wording in the Form A is sufficient
of a brokerage agreement to satisfy that a commission
would be paid upon the broker finding a willing and able
buyer (Page 45)
....I don't think the letter of April 22nd or anything
in Form A satisfies [sic] the requirement of the law of
the Statute of Frauds or the requirement as far as what
must be in writing for a brokerage. (Page 46)
.... I am of the opinion that the wording in the April
22nd letter and the Form A is not sufficient to spell out
that anything was going to be paid regardless of what
took place. I think the parties came down to it, that
they did negotiate, and there may have been some
misunderstanding as far as what was supposed to be paid
rtol Mr.Florence. (Page 47, emphasis added)

10

By those statements, the trial court expressed its inability
to comprehend the parties1 intent because the written language
employed was illegible and ambiguous.

Inexplicably, the court

refused to consider available extrinsic evidence of the parties'
intent although it was clearly brought to the court's attention in
memoranda and argument.

In effect, the trial court resolved the

issue by determining that it could not understand what the parties
intended from the language used, and that since the court could not
discern

the parties' intent

from

the written

language, the

agreement was unenforceable; regardless what the other evidence
outside the writing itself may disclose concerning its meaning.
That view does violence to the Parol Evidence Rule, which exists
for the very purpose of resolving such ambiguities.
The trial court's ruling in that respect is not in accord with
prevailing authority.

As indicated above, the interpretation of

a contract may either be a question of law, to be determined by the
words of the agreement if they are clear and unambiguous; or a
question of fact to be determined by extrinsic evidence of intent.
Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Heriford, 772 P.2d 466 (Utah App.
1989).

If the contract is found to be ambiguous and the trial

court makes findings regarding the intent of the parties, on appeal
those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
erroneous.

Id. at 468.

It would follow that if the trial court

11

determines the contract to be ambiguous and makes no findings
regarding the intent of the parties but dismisses because of the
ambiguity, that failure would constitute reversible error.
is the posture of this case.

Such

The trial court made no attempt to

determine the intent of the parties, after having found the
critical ambiguity.
In C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P.2d 923, 929 (Utah App.
1988), the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's order granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment with the following
language:
Since the very essence of a finder's arrangement is
locating buyers with whom a seller might do business.. .it
would be extraordinary if the trial court were to
conclude, absent a contractual provision expressly and
unambiguously so providing, that the parties really meant
to exclude certain properties from the scope of their
agreement. (Emphasis in original)
Nonetheless, the
ambiguity in the contract leaves that possibility open.
That ambiguity creates a material factual issue making
summary judgment inappropriate and requiring resort to
extrinsic evidence by the fact finder in an effort to
determine what the parties actually intended. (Emphasis
added) IsL. at 929.
An ambiguity obviously exists in paragraph six (6) of the
April 22, 1983, agreement pertaining to the $200,000.00 annuity.
As the trial court correctly observed, that provision has no clear
meaning without further explanation.3

3

It does not state to whom

Trial Court's Bench Ruling, page 45-6 (Addendum, Exhibit 1)
12

the annuity is to be paid, when, or for what.

Standing alone, it

has no apparent meaning; yet it must mean something or the parties
would not have written it into their agreement.
evidence clearly discloses its meaning and

Available parol

should have been

considered by the court, but was not.
Appellant maintains, and his position is amply supported by
the record, that paragraph six (6) of the April 22, 1983 agreement
provides for his commission, payable subject to the conditions
appearing above it; that each of those conditions were satisfied;
and that the commission was thereby earned.

Those assertions are

supported by the deposition testimony of the seller, Mr. David
Johnson, which the trial court failed to consider. Defendants have
offered no other or better explanation for the $200,000.00 annuity
provision, despite close questioning in the Quist depositions
concerning its meaning and intent. There is quite simply no other
or better meaning to be given the language used than that suggested
by the appellant.4

The trial court determined that the opposing affidavit
of plaintiff was "flawed" but did not identify any particular
portions that did not conform to Rule 56(e). There are clearly
certain portions of the Florence affidavit which are admissible and
pertain to the parties' intent in the April 22, 1983 agreement.
The trial court disregarded all matters it considered to be
extrinsic evidence.

13

Under applicable law, to the extent there is ambiguity there
exists an issue of fact which, standing alone, precludes summary
judgment. Parol evidence is always to be considered upon a finding
of ambiguity in such cases to explain the parties1 intent; which
may indeed be explained in no other way.

Faulkner, at 1293.

Where intent is at issue, under Utah law it must be determined
by a finder of fact and cannot be resolved by summary judgment*
The Appellate Court in C.J. Realty, supra, held:
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the parties intended the property at issue to be
included in the contract, we reverse the trial court's
summary judgment and remand for further factual findings
consistent with this opinion.
Id. at 929.(emphasis
added)
Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous
can they be interpreted as such by the judge and made a basis for
summary judgment.

Colonial Leasing v. Larson Bros. Const., 731

P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).

If the evidence as to the terms of an

agreement is in conflict, the intent of the parties as to the terms
of the agreement may only be determined by the use of extrinsic
evidence, and submission to a jury. Id. at 488. In this case the
trial court did neither.

Where questions arise in the interpre-

tation of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the
document itself.

It should be looked at in its entirety and in

accordance with its purpose. All of its parts should be given

14

effect insofar as that is possible.

Regional Sales Agency, Inc.

v. Reichert, 122 Utah Adv.Rep. 46, 48 (Ct. App. 1989)(quoting Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)). When that process fails to produce a clear
meaning and intent, other evidence should, and must, be considered.
In this case it quite clearly was not.
It remains uncertain from the contract language itself whether
paragraph six (6) of the April 22, 1983 agreement was contemplated
a commission to be paid appellant for his successful efforts in
bringing the buyer and seller together on mutually agreeable terms,
was part of the consideration to be paid by S.N.L. for purchase of
SIC, or was something else.

Since two or more plausible meanings

can be derived from the language used

(to the extent it is

legible), and the trial court failed to consider available parol
evidence to determine the parties1 intent; the trial court clearly
erred in ruling as it did.5
B.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
PAROL EVIDENCE TO RESOLVE AMBIGUITY IN THE
PARTIES1 APRIL 22, 1983 AGREEMENT.

It is the well-settled general rule that if an agreement is
ambiguous because of lack of clarity in the meaning of particular

Jarman v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 794 P.2d 492 (Utah
App. 1990); Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas,
785 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

15

terms, it is subject to parol evidence concerning what the parties
intended.

Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros, Const., 731 P.2d

483 (Utah 1986).6
Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to
consider extrinsic or parol evidence which was available in the
record to resolve ambiguity in the April 22, 1983 letter agreement
between the parties.

As indicated, the trial court in its bench

ruling determined that paragraph six (6) of the letter agreement
was ambiguous and for that reason insufficient to constitute an
enforceable

contract; without considering extrinsic

or parol

evidence which was available to resolve the ambiguity and clarify
the parties1 intent.

The Utah Supreme Court in Ron Case Roofing

& Asphalt v. Blomcuist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) stated:
[The Court] first looks to the four corners of the
agreement to determine the intentions of the parties and
the use of extrinsic evidence is permitted only if the
document appears to incompletely express the parties1
agreement or if it is ambiguous in expressing that
agreement.
The trial court in this case did not first "look to the four
corners" of the letter agreement as a whole. The court considered
only the language contained in paragraph six (6) which it determined was ambiguous and therefore not sufficient "of a brokerage

Citing Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983)
16

agreement."

Viewing the subject agreement as a whole, several

points are established.
and the defendants.

The agreement is between the appellant

The agreement sets forth the financial terms

for the purchase of S.I.C. by S.N.L. Financial. The agreement
provides for an annuity in the amount of $200,000.00 which is not
part of the consideration to be given for S.I.C.

Available parol

evidence in the record discloses that the $200,000.00 annuity
represents an agreed broker's commission to appellant for bringing
the buyer and seller together on mutually agreeable terms.
As a matter of law, the trial court committed error in not
considering extrinsic or parol evidence to determine the parties1
intent.

The parties and the court acknowledge that the language

of paragraph six is somewhat illegible and that, standing alone,
it is ambiguous to the extent it is legible.

If its' meaning or

the parties' intent is to be understood, other evidence is
required.

Other evidence was available in the record but was not

considered by the court.
In Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987), the court
stated "[I]t is not necessary, however, that the contract itself
contain all the particulars of the agreement.

The crucial factor

is that the parties agreed on the essential elements of the

Tr. Bench Ruling, pg. 45.
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contract•"
of

its

In the present case, SeN.L. agreed in writing as part

agreement

something.

to pay

someone a

$200,000.00

annuity

for

That item was not a part of the purchase price, and

from the available, but unconsidered evidence, it is undisputed
that

the

$200,000.00

commission.

annuity

was

in

fact

the

appellant's

Mr. Johnson did not regard that item as part of his

consideration from SNL.

He understood and has testified that the

$200,000.00 annuity was in fact the appellant's commission.8

The

appellant has testified he understood that to be the case, and the
defendants have provided no other explanation.

The hard fact is

that paragraph six annuity was the appellant's commission, and
nothing else.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT THE AGREEMENT DID NOT SATISFY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The trial court stated:
I am not persuaded that either the wording in
paragraph 6 or the wording in the Form A is sufficient
of a brokerage agreement to satisfy that a commission
would be paid upon the broker finding a willing and able
buyer. I don't think it's sufficient writing to meet
that requirement and must be in writing under the Statute
of Frauds.9

Johnson depo., pg. 24, Addendum, Exhibit 6.
Tr.Bench Ruling, pages 4-5 [Addendum, Exhibit 1].
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The Statute of Frauds, 25-5-4 U.C.A., 1953 as amended7",
provides

that

lf

[e]very

agreement

shall

be void

unless

such

agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith•"

Since the

document is unquestionably a "note or memorandum" of some agreement
between the parties and is subscribed by the "party to be charged"
(S.N.L.)/ it obviously satisfies the Statute of Frauds. The trial
court erred in ruling that the April 22, 1983 letter agreement did
not.
It is also well settled that the Statute of Frauds does not
preclude a party from proving the true nature of an agreement when
that is the issue, rather than enforceability.11

In this case, the

only issue presented on summary judgment was whether there existed
an agreement which provided Appellant a commission.

The Statute

of Frauds does not require that the "note or memorandum" be clear
or unambiguous, but only that it exist.

For the trial court to

conclude as it did that the written agreement did not satisfy the

1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, rewrote the
beginning of the section and made minor stylistic changes. The
pre-1989 amendment should apply to this case.
Section 68-3-3
U.C.A. (1986) provides that "[n]o part of these revised statutes
is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." See also Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988).
11

Colonial Leasing v. Larson Bros. Const.f 731 P.2d 483,
486 (Utah 1986).

19

Statute of Frauds because its meaning was unclear to the court is
manifest error J2
In order to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds,
Utah courts have held that the required "memorandum must identify
the parties, subject matter, and set out the conditions of the
transaction with adequate certainty." Furthermore, "the memorandum
must show what the contract was, and not merely note the fact that
some contract was made." Machan Hampshire v. Western Real Estate,
779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah App* 1989)(emphasis added).

The subject

agreement clearly meets the above requirements by identifying the
parties13, subject matter14, and conditions15 of the transaction.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS
NOT A BROKERAGE AGREEMENT ENTITLING APPELLANT TO
AN AGREED COMMISSION UPON COMPLETION OF HIS PERFORMANCE.
By definition, a "broker" is a person whose duties are not
limited to the sale of real property. Black's Law Dictionary, 174

Footnote 2, supra.
13

The April 22, 1983 agreement was addressed to the
appellant and signed by appellee George Quist. [Addendum, Exhibit
2]
14

Subject matter of the April 22, 1983 set forth with
particularity the items for purchase by SNL. [Addendum, Exhibit 2]
15

Conditions are set forth in the first paragraph of the
April 22, 1983 agreement. [Addendum, Exhibit 2]

20

(5th Ed.) defines a "broker" as:
An agent employed to make bargains and contracts for
a compensation.
A middleman or negotiator between
parties
A person whose business it is to bring buyer
and seller together. The term extends to almost every
branch of business, to realty as well as personalty.
The trial court narrowly considered appellant's role as a
"broker" to be limited to the sale of real property.16
court stated:

The trial

"I so find that, I don't think that this is a

brokerage situation. There is not the sale of real property here*
... Therefore, I don't think that law applies at the outset*"17
The court obviously erred in disregarding the fact that the
agreement on its face involves several pieces of real property as
part of the consideration to be given for S.I.C.

[Addendum,

exhibit 2]; and in overlooking the fact that a broker's rights and
duties are not

limited to transactions only involving

"real

property."
The general rule accepted in Utah is that a "broker" has
earned his commissions upon the procuring of a buyer who is ready,
willing and able to buy on terms acceptable to the seller.

This

general rule applies whether or not real property is involved.
Lanaston v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah 1987); Bushnell Real

16

Bench Ruling, page 5 (Addendum).

17

id.
21

Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983)*

Significantly

to this case, the court in Lanaston held:
Absent a contractual provision which conditions the
right to a commission on the performance or part
performance of the buyer, the broker is not an
insurer of the subsequent performance of the
contract and is not deprived of his right to a
commission by the failure or refusal of the buyer
to perform. Lanaston, at 558. (Emphasis added)
In this case, the evidence if it were allowed to be considered
by a finder of fact would establish the existence of a commission
agreement, full performance by the broker, and an unexcused refusal
to perform at the time of closing by defendant S.N.L., the buyer.
Appellant is entitled to have that evidence fully and fairly
considered by a fact finder.
A

broker

cannot

control

the parties1

behavior

after

a

definitive agreement to buy and sell has been reached, but can only
bring the buyer and seller together on mutually agreeable terms.
This the appellant did at his own effort and his own expense in
consideration for S.N.L.'s promise to pay him a commission if he
succeeded in doing so. The Appellant, as a broker, can do no more
than that. Under Utah law, he is entitled to his commission under
the facts of this case. Resolving the ambiguities should be left
to a jury rather than being preempted by summary judgment.
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POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
A CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THE MAY 31, 1984 RELEASE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH HAD NOT BEEN SATISFIED.
Appellees argued in support of their motion for summary
judgment that the parties1 May 31, 1984 agreement

[Addendum,

exhibit 3] superceded the April 22, 1983 agreement; and that
failure of the sale to actually close precluded appellant from
claiming his commission.

Appellant argued that the May 31, 1984

agreement was prospective and void for failure to satisfy one of
its conditions precedent; namely the approval of a third party.
Although the trial court did not base its ruling upon the May 31,
1984 document because it found there to be no brokerage agreement,
the court did indicate that if there were a brokerage agreement,
the condition precedent would be considered of no importance. [Tr.
Bench Ruling, pg. 45, addendum exhibit 1]
The plain language of the May 31, 1984 document includes a
"subject to" provision requiring prior approval by the third party
which was never forthcoming. The law of contracts is well settled
regarding such conditions precedent and the necessity of satisfying
them before the agreement becomes enforceable.18

Restatement of

Contracts (Second) Section 225 states the general rule as follows:

17 Am. Jur.2d Contracts, Section 320 et.seq (1964).
23

Performance of a duty subject to a condition cannot
become due unless the condition occurs or its nonoccurrence is excused..
Unless it has been excused, the non-occurrence of
a condition discharges the duty when the condition can
no longer occur. (Emphasis added)
The second paragraph of the May 31, 1984 agreement specifically creates a condition precedent to the entire May 31, 1984
agreement, which it is undisputed never occurred.

That paragraph

provides:
"This agreement is subject to approval of Mr. Joseph
Henroid of the law firm of Nielson and Senior of Salt
Lake City, Utah, particularly in regard to that certain
court order of approximately October 1983 regarding the
divorce of Giles H. and Ululani Florence." (Emphasis
added)
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Welch Transfer
and Storage, Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d 73 (Utah 1983):
Where fulfillment of a contract is made to depend
upon the act or consent of a third person over whom
neither party has control, the contract cannot be
enforced unless the act is performed or the consent
given.(citations omitted)(Emphasis added)
In this case, the trial court indicated that the condition
requiring approval by a third party had "no bearing whatsoever as
far as this situation is concerned."19

That view is contrary to

well established principles of contract law.

Bench Ruling, page 45 [Addendum, exhibit 1]
24

The basic objective in construing any contract must be to give
effect to the intentions of the parties.

If possible, those

intentions must be determined from an examination of the texts of
the agreements. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat. Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229
(Utah 1987); DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978); Qberhanslv
v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977).

It is apparent in this case

both that the trial court failed to view the two written documents
as a whole, or harmonize them if possible.

Upon finding that

ambiguities existed, the trial court failed to consider available
evidence of the parties' intent outside the April

22, 1983

agreement and without such evidence held the agreement to be
unenforceable.
an

The trial court then suggested that if there were

enforceable brokerage agreement the May

31, 1984 release

agreement would apply, while failing to recognize the significance
of a failed condition precedent to that agreement. The trial court
erred in disregarding the significance of the failed condition
precedent.

CONCLUSION
The trial court committed reversible error in failing to
consider extrinsic or parol evidence to determine the intent of the
parties' April 22, 1983 letter agreement, after finding as a matter
of law that the agreement was unclear and ambiguous.
25

The trial

court erred in granting summary judgment after making that
determination because the court's finding in and of itself legally
acknowledged that a genuine issue of material fact exists, namely
the meaning of the ambiguous terms.

The trial court failed to

follow the basic legal process in construing any ambiguous contract
term by considering extrinsic evidence of the parties1 intent.
The trial court erred in determining that the parties'
agreement did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, since the parties
to be charged did in fact sign a "note or memorandum" of their
agreement.
The trial court erred in determining that the parties1
agreement was not a brokerage agreement entitling Appellant to a
commission upon completion of his performance, for the stated
reason that the court did not understand real property to be
involved in that agreement.
Finally, the trial court erred in failing to recognize the
significance of a failed condition precedent in the May 31, 1984
prospective release agreement between the parties.
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's
order granting Appellee a summary judgment of dismissal should be
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent
with applicable law. The trial court's errors are so numerous and
apparent that this court should clearly set forth the applicable

26

standards for the trial court's guidance on remand.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

±^

day of April, 1991.

^ANTHONY M. THURBER
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF this

£?

day of April, 1991, to the following:

Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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PRO

C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

4

The matter before the Court i s the

5

case o f Giles Florence versus S.N.L. Financial

6

Corpor ation aiid George Quist.
Is the plaintiff present and ready to

7
8

proceed?
MR. THURBER:

9
10

THE COURT:

11

MR. NIELSEN:

12

THE COURT:

17

And the defendant is ready, your

Then you may proceed.

Would you

please state your names for the benefit of the repo rter.

15
16

And the defendant?

Honor.

13
14

Pla.intiff is, your Honor.

MR. THURBER:

Anthony M. Thurber for the

MR. NIELSEN:

Arthur H. Nielsen, attorney for

plaintiff.

18

the de fendant and movant in the matter of the Motion for

19

Summary Judgment.

20

If it please the Court, and counsel, at the

21

outset I would like to move the publication of the

22

deposi tions of George Quist and Scott Quist which were

23

taken , by the plaintiff some years ago, your Honor.

24

during my absence in I srael , apparently the originaIs

25

got misplaced.

And

We have not been able to locate the
2

1

original deposition of Mr. George Quist.

But I have

2

asked Mr. Thurber if he has any objection to using a

3

Certified Copy, and he said no.

4

Certified Copy here before me and would like to have it

5

published and would like to refer to it during the

6

course of my argument.

And I have the

7

THE COURT:

Any problem,

counsel?

8

MR. THURBER:

No.

9

MR. NIELSEN:

With reference to the original

10

deposition of Mr. Scott Quist, we did locate that.

11

Mr. Scott Quist put it in the mail to me and it didn't

12

get to my office by yes terday.

13

thiss morning and it was not there.

14

say, I would like to fi le that with the Court if the

15

Court desires to pursue it in any respect.

16

as I know, I don't beli eve his deposition will be

17

significant in connection with the argument.

18

I don't intend to utili ze it.

19

plaintiff does, I'll

20

the original during the day.

21

And

And I went down again
I would only have to

But as far

If it is,

And if counsel for the

certainly see that your Honor gets

Now, again as a pre].iminary matter in the

22

course of my discussion this morning, your Honor has,

23

I fm sure, reviewed the IMotion i:or Summary Judgment as

24

well as counsel for the plaintiff's opposition thereto.

25 | And I would like to mak s an obslervation that, with
3

,

1

reference to the counterobjections to the Motion for

2

Summary Judgment which were filed by the plaintiff, to

3

the extent that they rely upon the evidence of

4

Mr. Florence, we object to the use of that Affidavit

5

because it is not in conformity with Rule 56 of the

6

Rules of Civil Procedure relating to affidavits to be

7

filed in connection with summary judgments.
Let me just read to your Honor Rule 56(e)

8
9
10

which provides as to the form of affidavits that further
testimony defense is required.
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall

11
12

be made on personal knowledge, s hall set

13

forth such facts as would be adm issible in

14

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that

15

the affiant is competent to testify to the

16

matter stated therein."
Now, on its face the Affidavit says that itfs

17
18

based upon the best knowledge and belief of the client.

19

And therefore, the jurat, itself, does not conform to

20

the rule.

21

would indicate to your Honor that it is full of

But a very casual perusal of that Affidavit

22 j conclusions, interpretations of the witness, legal
23

opinions, so to speak, and is not based upon the

24

client's actual knowledge.

25

Now, there may be some matters in that
4

1

Affidavit that would be pertinent.

2

that your Honor feels that they are, I certainly have no

3

objection to your Honor considering them.

4

all, I think that it is significant to note that, in our

5

opinion, they do not identify any relevant evidence in

6

this matter*

7

And to the extent

But above

Let me just point to two items in the

8

evidence that I think clearly identify or illustrate

9

what I am referring to.

First of all, the Affidavit

10

refers to a certain exhibit, our document, which the

11

Affidavit states was the final agreement between

12

Mr. Johnson, who is the principal owner of the Security

13

International Life Insurance Company and S.N.L.

14

Financial.

15

it is identified by Mr. Florence in his Affidavit as the

16

final agreement states on its face, "...with definite

17

agreement to follow."

18

preliminary negotiations.

19

over their signature said, this would have to be

20

followed by a definite agreement.

21

And that document, itself, on page 3, when

In other words, these were
And the parties, themselves,

Likewise, Mr. Florence in his Affidavit

22

refers to a letter dated May 31, 1984, on which we rely

23

as a matter of fact, addressed to G.H. Ill National

24

Corporation of Las Vegas, Nevada in which S.N.L.

25

Financial Corporation agrees that, "Upon the closing of
5

the transaction described below, S.N.L. Financial
2

Corporation agrees to pay to your company $50,000," and

3

it goes on in the recital.

4
5

The final paragraph says,
"This agreement is subject to approval of

6

Mr. Joseph Henroid of the law firm of

T

Nielsen & Senior of Salt Lake City,

8

particularly in regard to that certain court

9

order of approximately October 1983

j

10

regarding the divorce of Giles H. and Euloni

11

Florence."

12

The Affidavit then goes on to say that

13

Mr. Henroid was not approached and did not approve it.

14

Obviously Mr. Florence could not know that.

15

the one that had the duty to do it, he could testify

16

that he did not do it.

17

or not, he obviously couldn't testify.

18

If he was

But whether somebody else did it

But it is, I think, of some significance that

19

there was a divorce pending between Mr. Florence and

20

Mrs. Florence in the State of Arizona.

21

filed in this court by Mrs. Florence against S.N.L.

22

stating that, if and when there was any commission

23

payable to Mr. Florence, that there be an injunction

24

issued prohibiting Mr. Florence or the S.N.L.

25

Corporation from paying Mr. Florence.

And a suit was

And it was that
6

matter, I'm sure, that precipitated this kind of a
2

statement.
In other words, S.N.L. couldn't pay

3
4

Mr. Florence anything, even if it owed it to him under

5

that order.

6

your Honor, and the particular case here filed in this

7

case —

8

dissolve that injunction.

9

not be, in my opinion, relevant to this case.

10

But for the purpose again of this record,

I can give you the case number —

that did

So again, that matter would

Now, with those preliminary remarks, let me

11

state that there was a fina 1 and formal agreement

12

entered into by Mr. Johnson , not Mr. Florence but by

13

Mr. Johnson with S.N.L. Cor poration with respect to the

14

purchase by S.N.L. Corporation of Mr. Johnson's stock in

15

the Security International Corporation, Security

16

International Insurance Company.

17

distinguish between the two companies.

18

S.N.L. by its initials, and we could refer to the other

19

corporation in North Dakota as the "international"

20

corporation.

21

I guess we need to
We could call

At least that word is in its name.

Now, I point out to your Honor, again by way

22

of a preliminary background statement, that in order for

23

S.N.L. Corporation to acquire the stock of the

24

international corporation iia North Dakota, it was

25

necessary that the matter b<a submitted to the Insurance
7

1

Department of North Dakota.

Everyone agrees to that.

2

For that purpose S.N.L. Corporation had hired a

3

Mr. Gilbert McSwain of Denver, a securities lawyer who

4

had done work both for S.N.L. Corporation and also for

5

the international North Dakota corporation in times past

6

relating to their securities matters.

7

But in this particular situation, Mr. McSwain

8

was employed by S.N.L. Corporation to prepare all of the

9

necessary documents to submit to the Insurance

10

Department of North Dakot a for confirmation and approval

11

of this acquisition.

12

document sometimes referr ed to as a prospectus but

13

principally referred to as a Form A.

14

referring to that Form A in the course of my discussion

15

here, again to bring your Honor up to the point where I

16

think it becomes critical with reference to our motion.

And that is done under a formal

And I'll be

That Form A is Exhibit 4 to Mr. Quist's

17
18

deposition.

And if the c lerk would hand your Honor the

19

deposition of Mr. Quist, I would like you to refer to

20

Exhibit 4 which is a rath er lengthy document consisting

21

of a number of sections.
Approximately in the first third or near the

22
23

center of this Form A is a document entitled Stock

24

Purchase Agreement.

25

give you better identification for it, but it follows
!

I wish, your Honor, that I could

8

1

immediately after page 29 and is identified as

2

Appendix B.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. NIELSEN:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. NIELSEN:

7

section.

Well, I have got page 29.
What f s the next page?
Page 30.
Then you have the wrong

May I come to the bench?

8

THE COURT:

You may.

9

MR. NIELSEN:

This is the formal final

10

agreement between Mr. Johnson and S.N.L. Corporation,

11

which of course had to be submitted along with the

12

other documents to the Department of Insurance of North

13

Dakota for the purpose of confirming and confirmation

14

of this transaction.

15

Department of Insurance.

16

And it was approved by the

Now, with regard to that Stock Purchase

17

Agreement, let me identify for your Honor two or three

18

items in it that I think are of significance here,

19

particularly as they relate to the Affidavit of

20

Mr. Florence, as well as to other response by the

21

plaintiff in this matter with respect to our Motion for

22

Summary Judgment.

23

Paragraph 1.1 on page 2 is the Agreement of

24

the Seller to sell his stock in the corporations known

25

as Security International Insurance Company, as well as
9

1

Security Insurance National Corporation.

2

the Agreement of the Purchaser.

3

Purchaser says that,

Point 1.3 is

The Agreement of the

4

"At the closing purchaser shall purchase

5

and accept the sales from the seller for an

6

aggregate version of the following..."

7

And then on the following page, page 3, there

8

identifies all of the consideration that S.N.L.

9

Corporation is to pay for Mr. Johnson's stock.

10

Now, if you were to review that very

11

carefully, and we can go over it for all of those assets

12

that are to be transferred, you will note, your Honor,

13

that there is nothing said about, quote, "renewal

14

commissions," or anything of that kind.

15

matter which, although Mr. Florence says they got in an

16

argument about that matter, that's not a part of this

17

Agreement.

18

it, it had no relevance about whether there was an

19

agreement to sell or not to sell.

20

This is a

So if they did get into an argument about

The next page, on page 4, paragraph 2.2 says

21

that, "There are no conflicting agreements."

22

representation and warranty by Mr. Johnson.

23

had some other conflicting agreement with reference to

24

this, that he represents that there are none.

25

This is a
So if he

If you carry on then to page 6, paragraph
10

1

2.8, subparagraph (c) near the top of the page, he also

2

warrants that,

3

"There are no employment or deferred

4

compensation agreements between S.I.C or

5

S.I. I.C. and its shareholders, officers,

6

directors, employees, agents or

7

consultants."

8
9

Well, Mr. Johnson was president of both of
those companies.

And here he represents and warrants

10

that there are no conflicting agreements as to any kind

11

of compensation that he is supposed to get.

12
13

Paragraph (f) also states that any
indebtedness,

14

"There is no indebtedness or other

15

liability or obligation, whether absolute,

16

accrued, contingent or otherwise incurred or

17

other transaction engaged in by S.I.C or

18

S.I.I.C. except in the ordinary course of

19

business with the parties, other than

20

seller, which is material."

21
22
23
24

So now he is saying there is none with any -with him with S.I.C or with S.I.I.C.
May I then ask your Honor to turn to
paragraph 10 —

excuse me, page 10, paragraph 5.

In the

25 J middle of page 10 is says Conditions and Obligations of
11

1
2

Each Party
"The obligations of each party to

3

consummate this Agreement and the

4

transaction to be consummated by them

5

hereunder on the closing shall be subject to

6

the satisfaction prior to or concurrently

7

with the closing of each of the conditions

a

set forth in this Section 5."

9

Then it goes on to delineate what those items

10

are, so that there can be no question about the fact

11

that there are to be no changes or no inconsistency.

12
13
14

Paragraph 9, then we come to a very
interesting paragraph on page 12.

Paragraph 9 says,

"Closing of this Agreement and certain of

15

the transactions provided for herein shall

16

take place at the offices of Keller,

17

McSwain, Wing and Maxfield — " noting, your

18

Honor, that McSwain is the attorney who is

19

handling this matter —

20

Denver, Colorado at 10 a.m. local time, not

21

later than the third business day following

22

the day that seller acquires the shares, or

23

such other time as the parties may mutually

24

agree."

25

"in the City of

Now, Mr. Florence in his Affidavit says that
12

1

they met up in North Dakota on the 31st of May to close

2

it.

3

they'll close it in Denver in Mr. McSwain's office.

4

Mr. Quist in his deposition says they didn't meet up

5

there for the purpose of closing but to negotiate

6

because there were some changes which Mr. Johnson wanted

7

to make.

Mr. McSwain was not there.

8
9

And this Agreement says

But that I am merely again pointing out to
your Honor in terms of the background.

And I would

10

confess that if that is a critical matter, then there is

11

a dispute.

12

merely points out the inaccuracy, so to speak, of

13

Mr. Florence's Affidavit.

14

position that I am going to present to your Honor in

15

just a moment or two.

But I don't think it is critical.

It just

But it does illustrate the

16

On the following page, page 13, it says that,

17

"Each party hereto shall pay its own

18

expenses in connection with this Agreement

19

and the transaction contemplated hereby."

20
21
22

And the final one which I think is very
important, paragraph 13.1 says,
"This Agreement supersedes all prior

23

discussions and agreements between the

24

parties with respect to the sale of the

25

shares and the other matters contained in
13

1

this Agreement.

2

including the exhibits hereto, contain the

3

sole and entire agreement between the

4

parties hereto with reference to the

5

transactions contemplated hereby."

6

And this Agreement,

Now, regardless of anything else, these

7

exhibits to Mr. Florence's deposition, or Affidavit,

8

clearly now are superseded by this final Agreement

9

entered into by Mr. Johnson and S.N.L. Corporation and

10

submitted to the Insurance Department of North Dakota

11

for its approval. • So we are not concerned here with

12

these writings which have formed a part of

13

Mr. Florence's Affidavit.

14

One other point, then I'll get down to the

15

critical matter, is that Mr. Florence said that one of

16

the first things that happened —

17

deposition —

18

Dakota on the 31st of May was that he and Mr. Quist got

19

into an argument about what commission he was supposed

20

to get.

21

expenses from any commission which Mr. Florence would

22

get when the deal was finally closed.

23

says that was not a part of the transaction.

24
25

again referring to his

when they got in the meeting up in North

And Mr. Quist said he was going to deduct the

And Mr. Florence

Let me refer your Honor to an earlier portion
of this same Exhibit 4.

And that is again a numbered
14

1

portion of it.

2

before the one that we referred to.

3

would gfo back to the first of that exhibit, or Appendix

4

B , and just two pages before that I think is page 26.

5

But it is on page 26 of the section just
So if your Honor

Do you have it?

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. NIELSEN:

Section 15?
Yes.

Here again this is the

8

Form A that's submitted to the insurance department for

9

its app roval.

10
11

In this it refers to commissions and

finder1 s fees.
"S.I.C and Security Holding agree that

12

Mr. Giles Florence of Phoenix, Arizona has

13

acted as a finder in connection with the

14

transactions contemplated herein and that no

15

other party will serve as a finder.

16

parties agree that their respective expenses

17

— " talking about the parties was the seller

18

and the buyer -- "they agree that their

19

respective expenses incurred and to be

20

incurred in connection with the transaction

21

contemplated hereby —

22

limitation attorney fees, accountants fees,

23

travel, printing, mailing and postage --

24

shall be deducted from the fee of

25

Mr. Florence."

The

including without

15

So here it is stated before the Insurance
2

Department of North Dakota that these expenses which

3

Mr. Florence was apparently objecting to be deducted

4

from his fee when the matter was closed were already

5

identified, had been approved by the Department of

6

Insurance, and they were to all of these expenses

7

including attorney fees of the parties and all other

8

expenses to be deducted from whatever fee he was going

9

to get.
Now, let me address now what I considered to

10
11

be the substance of our Motion for Summary Judgment.

12

All other matters aside, we find the parties up in

13

Fargo, North Dakota on the 31st of May of 1984, almost a

14

year after the negotiations for the purchase of this

15

stock had begun.

16

we don!t dispute the fact that Mr. Florence was

17

concerned about getting a fee when this matter closed.

18

And he was concerned that these expenses were going to

19

be deducted.

And at that time it is recognized and

Mr. Quist, on the other hand, took the

20
21

position that when they got the matter closed -- and

22

they were there for some period of time, no documents

23

had even been prepared according tc) the testimony of

24

everybody.

25

matter —

They were there to further discuss the
that Mr. Florence should get a fee.

There was
16

1

no argument about the fact that he should get a fee.

He

2

had rendered some services as a finder.

3

was, one, how much it was going to be; and two, when was

4

he to get it and the conditions incident thereto.

5

it was finally agreed that he would get a fee.

The question

And

But Mr. Florence did not want to get the

6

He wanted it paid to a third party.

So Exhibits A

7

fee .

8

and B to our Motion for Summary Judgment, also Exhibit 5

9

to Mr . Quist's deposition, came into being.

10

is a Release.

Exhibit B

And this Release says that,
"I, Giles H. Florence, in consideration

11
12

--" note, your Honor, it says —

13

consideration of a letter dated May 31, 1984

14

from George R. Quist of S.N.L. Financial

15

Corporation hereby agree to release and

16

forever discharge all of the following

17

corporations and persons from any further

18

liability relating to the matters described

19

in the letter referred to."

20

"in

And then the first corporation listed on that

21 1 is S.N.L. Financial Corporation.
22

We submit, your Honor, this resolves any

23

issue between Mr. Florence and S.N.L. Corporation in

24

this matter.

25

This document has released.

Now, however, there was to be consideration
17

1

for it.

So the second document, also dated May 31,

2

1984, which is addressed, your Honor, to G.H. Ill

3

National Corporation of Las Vegas, Nevada, Mr. Florence

4

has now transferred or committed that whatever fee he is

5

going to get, if he was to get it, shall not be paid to

6

him but shall be paid to a third party.

7

Now, Mr. Florence in his Affidavit says he is

8

the sole owner of that corporation.

And I would accept

9

the fact that he is the president, although it would not

10

be the best evidence, he would properly testify that he

11

is the sole owner.

12

admissible.

13

document, itself.

14

different entity, a different person.

15

interest Mr. Florence had in any commissions was

16

released and discharged by the first document.

17
18

But I don't know if it would be

It would require the Articles or the
But regardless of that, it is a
And whatever

And upon the second document it says,
"Upon the closing of the transaction

19

described below, S.N.L. Financial

20

Corporation agrees to pay your company

21

$50,000 as further payments on a monthly

22

basis for 50 consecutive months."

23

says, "The $50,000 is to be paid at the

24

closing of said transaction.

25

payments shall be in full satisfaction of

And it

And such

18
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1

Mr. McSwain at the hearing before the insurance

2

department.

3

although he was to receive a note for a substantial sum

4

of money, nevertheless, that was not payable absolutely

5

but only in the event that premiums continued to be

6

paid.

7

It was clearly identified that Mr. Johnson,

In other words, he was to be paid out of the

8

premiums that were paid to the company.

9

premiums were not enough, then he did not get his note

10

paid.

11

insurance department.

12

correspondence.

13

contract for the purchase of the stock.

14
15

As I said, that was clearly explained before the
It was clearly explained in the

It was clearly explained in this

THE COURT:

Where is that you are reading

from, counsel?

16

MR. NIELSEN:

17

THE COURT:

18

And if the

What?
Where is that you are referring

to?

19

MR. NIELSEN:

That's at page 3 of the Stock

20

Purchase Agreement that I had just reviewed with your

21

Honor.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. NIELSEN:

24
25

You say it f s page 3.

1.9?

1.9, right.

"Purchaser will issue or will cause to
have issued and guarantee a premium note to
20

1

seller which shall be payable monthly."

2

And it goes on and describes it.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

4

MR. NIELSEN:

There is no dispute as to what

5

a premium note is, although again other documents in the

6

file —

7

but Mr. Quist's deposition, I think, does.

8

premium note is one that is contingent upon the payment

9

of the premiums.

Mr. Johnson's deposition does not refer to it
And a

So that these people got into a

10

discussion about trying to change the terms of this

11

Stock Purchase Agreement when they were up in North

12

Dakota on the 31st of May.

13

agree, and so they agreed to disagree.

14

And they were not able to

Now, that was not the only disagreement.

15

There were many.

16

thing for this Motion for Summary Judgment is that the

17

matter did not close.

18

to the payment of this money to G.H. Ill National

19

Corporation, not to Florence but to G.H. Ill, never came

20

to fruition.

21

But the significant and important

And so the conditions incident

It was there.

The Agreement was there.

It's

22

a binding agreement.

And we submit, your Honor, that if

23

a condition incident to it did not take place, and

24

regardless of what you might say about who was at fault

25

or was not at fault, the matter remains that it just did
21

1

not occur; and therefore, the obligation to pay G.H. Ill

2

Corporation never, shall I say, came to a point of when

3

the payment would be required to be made.

4

It was not that there wasn't any

5

requirement.

It's the date on which it is to be paid.

6

And if I give your Honor a promissory note payable when

7

somebody dies and the person doesn't die, I don't ever,

8

I guess, have to pay it.

That's a poor illustration of

9

what I am trying to say.

But it does illustrate the

10

fact that a condition did attach, and therefore the

11

payment did not become due.

12

But in any event, if it had become due or if

13

there is any claim of breach on the part of S.N.L.,

14

which Mr. Florence seems to indicate that there was,

15

that it was S.N.L.'s thought that it didn't come to a

16

closing, that would be the concern of G.H. Ill, not the

17

concern of Florence.

18

all his rights.

19

is one to bring an action on the basis there was a

20

breach on the part of S.N.L. of the conditions which

21

made it impossible for performance; and therefore, G.H.

22

III is entitled to payments or for damages by reason of

23

that breach.

24
25

Because he has waived and released

It would be G.H. Ill's right if there

We submit, therefore, that there is no
material fact that is in dispute.

The material facts
22

are found within the four corners of those two
2

documents , Exhibits A and B to the Motion, and also

3

Exhibit 5 to Mr. Quistfs deposition.

4

therefore , we are entitled to summary judgment.
MR. THURBER:

5

And we submit,

Judge, before we begin, as I

6

indicated to Mr. Nielsen this morning and the Court

7

yesterday , there is a later version of the document

8

that1s so difficult to read.

9

initials.

10

And it does have all the

And I think that's the one we should use.

Mr. Nielsen has a copy and here is a copy for you.
MR. NIELSEN:

11

May I mention this, your Honor.

12

The new document which Mr. Thurber has given to me

13

purports 1to have some marking at the very bottom of the

14

page.

15

denies that that is his initials or any signature of

16

his.

17

the document.

18

I have shown that to Mr. George Quist, and he

And he is not aware of how or when that got onto

But as I have previously indicated, this

19

document would be entirely a preliminary one, and there

20

would be no way that I could identify which is

21

Mr. Quist 1s handwriting and someone else's.

And you

22 ! will note that Mr. Quist, the initials do not appear in
23

the margin next to any of the so-called changes or

24

additions or corrections.

25

MR. THURBER:

Well, for our purposes today,
23

i

1

all that doesn't matter, your Honor.

The point is that

2

this is the latest version of the document that we are

3

discussing.

4

for our purposes right now.

And whose initials are where doesn't matter
i

I think it's important for the Court to

5
6

understand something about the background of this

7

insurance company in North Dakota that was to be sold

8

and acquired by S.N.L. here.

9

founded by David Johnson, and he built this company --

This is a company that was

10

it's a small, relatively small North Dakota domestic

11

life insurance company —

12

with his own efforts.

13

formed the company and built the company.

over the last 25 or 30 years

He was an insurance salesman who

The question, the issue that destroyed this

14
15

closing was the question of his right to continue

16

renewals.

17

the terms of this sale.

18

Sales Agreement, but they are mentioned in the May 19th

19

agreement, specifically that Mr. Johnson will retain his

20

renewals.

Now, renewals are something that are outside
They aren't mentioned in the

Now, the renewals are simply the on-going

21
22

commissions that result to any general or ordinary agent

23

of a life insurance carrier for his production.

24

those are contractual matters between the company and

25

the agent.

And

And Mr. Johnson was a general agent in
24

1

addition to being a major stockholder in the holding

2

company.

3

in all of the production that he and his sub-agents had

4

produced for this North Dakota insurance company.

5

these renewals meant in terms of present value dollars

6

at the time that this closing should have occurred in

7

North Dakota something on the order of a million dollars

8

or more

He was a general agent and had renewal rights

And

So itfs a major, major item.
Now, Mr. Nielsen in his argument failed to

9
10

mention why it was that the deal didn't close in North

11

Dakota.

12

North Dakota for the purpose of discussing the matter

13

further

14

Mr. Johnson, the seller, whose deposition we took a

15

couple of weeks ago in Fargo, that he was there and they

16

were th ere for the purpose of closing.

He indicated that these people went up to

But the evidence is and the testimony of

And Mr. Quist came with his checkbook and

17
18

checked his bank balances and determined he didn't have

19

enough to come up with $350,000 down payment, and asked

20

Mr. Johnson to come up with the rest, the $150- of the

21

$200- that Mr. Quist had from his own company, which was

22

agreed to.

23

.

Mr. Johnson and he agreed with that.
And then after this happened, Mr. Quist comes

24

up with that brand new off-the-wall demand that Johnson

25

throw in his renewals.

It amounted to a demand for a
25

Mr. Nielsen's argument overlooks the entire
body of Utah and neighboring state law relating to
broker's commissions.

This is a case that is not

governed by the ordinary law of contracts, because it
stands in a category of its own which is the category
dealing with agents and brokers commissions.
Consideration does not play a role in contracts of this
nature.
The well-established law in Utah and
Colorado and Arizona and Idaho and other neighboring
jurisdictions is that a broker performs his duty and
becomes entitled to his commission, his agreed
commission, when he produces a ready, willing and able
buyer upon terms acceptable to both parties.
Now, Mr. Nielsen has not mentioned anything
in his memorandum or in his argument about that wellestablished and accepted body of Utah law which applies
clearly to the facts of this case.

He in his latest

memorandum suggests or he states —

I think it's on page

3 —

that this case involving this transaction did not

involve real property.
Well, quite the opposite is true.

If the

Court will look at the documents, there were at least
four pieces of real property, including a couple of
office buildings, that were part of the consideration
27

1

that he ever signed.

2

Now, going ahead with Mr. Nielsen's argument,

3

he said that the parties went to Fargo for the purpose

4

of further discussing this transaction and not for the

5

purpose of closing.

6

both Mr. Florence's Affidavit -- he was present at that

7

closing meeting —

8

says, which was taken a couple of weeks ago.

9

stated that the purpose of going there and the only

Well, that directly conflicts with

and what Mr. Johnson's deposition
They both

10

purpose of going there was to close the transaction.

11

at the very least have an issue of fact regarding that.

12

We

It's significant that the Form A filing,

13

neither the Form A filing nor any of the other documents

14

leading up to the closing meeting May 31st or the next

15

morning, June 1st of 1984, say anything about

16

Mr. Johnson giving up his renewals.

17

mention of his renewals is in the May 19, '83 Agreement

18

which provides that Johnson will retain those renewals.

19

That's a handwritten provision that was never changed

20

throughout this thing.

21

Johnson had to renewals between he and his insurance

22

company that had nothing to do with the sale of the

23

stock.

24
25

And the only

It's a contractual right that

Mr. Nielsen argues that because of the
language of the Agreement about the closing date in
31

Denver and the fact that it was to be in Denver, this
2 Ideal failed and there is no obligation on anybody's
3

part.

What he failed to point out is that that very

4

Agreement stated that the closing would be then and

5

there unless the parties mutually agreed otherwise.

6

Now, the evidence here is that the parties in Denver

7

agreed to adjourn for about a month.

8

when they met in Denver to adjourn for about a month and

9

finish it up in Fargo.

It was in April

The reason for that is that the

10

seller's attorney had some I's to dot and T's to cross,

11

but nothing substantial.

12

nature needed to be changed..

13

Nothing of a substantive

Now, Mr. Nielsen and Quist urge or argue that

14

at the closing Mr. Johnson came up with a number of new

15

and different conditions and demands.

16

his Affidavit and Mr. Johnson in his testimony at Fargo

17

have stated unequivocally that there was not a single

18

new or different demand by Johnson.

19

was this new off-the-wall demand by Quist that Johnson

20

throw in his million dollars of renewals.

21

killed the transaction.

22

Mr. Florence in

But the only change

And that

At the very least we have an issue of fact

23

concerning why the transaction failed.

But under the

24

applicable law, it doesn't matter.

25

to brokers commissions applies to this transaction,

If the law relating

32

1

which it does, it doesn't matter that the transaction

2

fails.

3

happening or not.

The entitlement exists regardless of the closing

4

And the reason is very simple.

The broker

5

who brings the parties together, who negotiates or works

6

out a mutually agreeable transaction between them, has

7

no control from that point on over whether or not the

8

transaction closes.

9

any reason or no reason, can decide not to go through

10

And either party for reasons, for

with the deal.

11

If the law were otherwise, the poor broker is

12

left out in the cold after he, at his own expense, at

13

his own effort and his own risk, has pulled together and

14

put together a transaction or a deal.

15

are talking about a multi-million-dollar deal.

16

isn't just a sale of a house or a garage.

17

big, big transaction that took more than a year of

18

Mr. Florence1s time and effort and experience to put it

19

together.

20

law applies to brokers agreements and commissions.

21

the usual law relating to contracts generally doesn't

22

have complete application in this field.

23

In this case we
This

This is a

That is the reason that a particular body of
And

Going to the document on which Mr. Nielsen

24

relies, if the Court examines both the Agreement and the

25

so-called Release that are attached together and dated
33

1

May 31st, I think the Court will see quite clearly that

2

we are dealing with a conditional agreement here.

3

conditions appearing in the Agreement of George Quist

4

are two:

5

Joseph Henroid.

6

but he was at that time, as I understand it, associated

7

in Mr. Nielsen's office.

8

and George Quist.

9

The

One is that the Agreement be approved by
Now, Joseph Henroid —

he is not now

Mr. Nielsen represents

S.N.L.

Mr. Florence of course would have no control

10

over what Mr. Henroid did or didn't do in the way of

11

approval because Henroid was not Florence's attorney.

12

So the point is, or the bottom line here is that the

13

Agreement was never submitted to Mr. Henroid for

14

approvals.

15

He never even saw it at all.
So by its very terms, a condition precedent

16

to the validity or the enforceability of this Agreement

17

didn't occur.

18

Agreement is void.

19

revert to the underlying agreement, which was the April

20

22nd agreement of the previous year, providing for a

21

$200,000 annuity.

22

Now, if a condition doesn't occur, the
And if the Agreement is void, we

Now, going beyond that though, there was

23

another condition, and this is the condition that on

24

which Mr. Nielsen relies.

25

occurred before a commission becomes due.

That is that the closing
Well, of
34

1

course it was the contemplation of the parties that a

2

closing would occur.

3

commission by $25,000 was the removal of the last

4

impediment to a closing.

5

perhaps Mr. Quist, it was contemplated that the closing

6

would follow.

7

to Mr. Johnson, and everyone would go their way and the

8

transaction would be concluded.

9

And this reduction of Florence's

So in everyone's mind, except

He would pay the down payment of $350,000

If that had happened, of course Mr. Florence

10

would be paid, or his wholly-owned company, G.H. Ill,

11

would be paid the $50,000 down and 50 payments of $2,500

12

a month.

13

Now, if that had happened, then according to

14

the Release Agreement that's attached, Mr. Florence

15

would become obligated to release, but only then.

16

here is why:

17

language of the release.

18

it's a contemplated release.

19

in the future.

20

And

If we read the Release, this is the
It is not a present release;
It's a release to be given

It says,

21

"I, Giles Florence, in consideration of the

22

letter dated May 31, '84 from Mr. George R.

23

Quist, president of S.N.L. Financial

24

Corporation, hereby agrees to release

25

hereby agree to release and forever

—
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has pojhtiiJ out, 1';. t; lawed with certain material and
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statements which would not be admissible in a court of
law.

However, there are statements in there that would

be admissible.
4 I

But assuming and accepting all of the

5

Affidavit, and assuming Mr. Thurber's position that this

6

is a broker situation -- and I think his statement of

7

the law is absolutely correct as far as a broker's

S

commission is concerned as far as producing an able and

9

willing buyer —

I first look at the letter of May 31st

10

and the Release of the same date.

11

accepts those —

12

but if I say they are the final documents, then by their

13

terms, they state that the money is not due until the

14

transaction or unless the transaction closes.

15

release would come into effect immediately upon the

16

letter becoming effective.

17

And if the Court

of course I am bound to accept them --

The

I don't think the release is effective until

18

the letter —

there is no release.

There is nothing to

19

be released until the letter becomes effective really.

20

And of course that is the law of brokerages, as

21

Mr. Thurber points out in his brief, that the commission

22

is due to a broker when he produces that willing and

23

able buyer, unless there are terms contained within the

24

agreement that makes it otherwise.

25

think that there are terms contained within the letter

But I certainly
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1

of May 31st.

2

brokerage situation, that that would prevent the

3

commission from being paid.

4

So as I say, assuming there was a

I donft think —

I am not persuaded that the

5

approval of Mr. Henroid has any bearing whatsoever as

6

far as the situation is concerned.

7

out here today, and I assumed that in reading this

8

yesterday, that when it refers to a divorce situation,

9

that it had something to do with the payment of money as

Itfs been pointed

10

far as the divorce and the parties were concerned.

11

don't think that has any bearing on it.

So I

12

Now, again assuming that this is a brokerage

13

situation, I go back to the letter of April 22nd and to

14

Form A of which has been referred to here today.

15

page 26, Section 15, the commission and finder's fee --

16

and of course I called Mr. Thurber yesterday and I

17

believe he was in touch with Mr. Nielsen as to the

18

wording of this paragraph 6, that the Court did feel

19

this was a critical situation, that the wording was

20

given to me.

21

And on

And of course as I was able to read it

22

myself, which I could not make it all out, I am not

23

persuaded that either the wording in paragraph 6 or the

24

wording in the Form A is sufficient of a brokerage

25

agreement to satisfy that a commission would be paid
45

1

upon the broker finding a willing and able buyer.

I

2

don't think it's sufficient writing to meet that

3

requirement and must be in writing under the Statute of

4

Frauds.

5

far as the terms.

That it does not spell out anything really as

6

And I know Mr. Thurber argues in his brief

7

that every particular term doesn't need to be spelled

8

out.

9

Agreement is concerned.

And I think that is correct also as far as the
But this one just does not even

10

get to the heart of it as far as indicating what is

11

going to be done as far as the payment of a finder's or

12

brokerage fee.

13

So assuming that everything that Mr. Thurber

14

says in his argument as far as the Affidavit and as far

15

as this being a brokerage transaction, I don't think the

16

letter of April 22nd or anything in Form A says the

17

requirement of the law of the Statute of Frauds or the

18

requirement as far as what must be in writing for a

19

brokerage.

20

Now, I am of the opinion, and I so find, that

21

I don't think that this is a brokerage situation.

22

is not the sale of real property here.

23

being traded or paid for the stock.

24

sale of real property.

25

law applies at the outset.

There

Real property is

But this is not the

Therefore, I don't think that
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1

I am of the opinion that the wording in the

2

April 22nd letter and the Form A is not sufficient to

3

spell out that anything was going to be paid, regardless

4

of what took place-

5

it, that they did then negotiate, and there may have

6

been some misunderstanding as far as what was supposed

7

to be paid by Mr. Florence.

8

writing as far as the letters of May 31st, the letter of

9

Release of May 31st —

10

I think the parties came down to

They reduced that to

I think that's the date, May

31st, 1984.

11

MR. NIELSEN:

12

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
And in those matters they did

13

spell out that a commission was going to be paid upon

14

the closing of the transaction, which never closed.

15

don't think it's material to this Court in this case as

16

to why this transaction did or did not occur.

17

be a cause of action in another action with other

18

parties, some of these parties.

19

material as far as this particular case is concerned.

20

I

That may

But I don't think it is

I don't think the questions of fact —

and I

21

think there are questions of fact as far as what took

22

place or what did not take place at the time of closing,

23

and what was said and what was not said, and why it

24

didn't close; there are disputes.

25

they are material as far as this particular case is

But I don't think

47

concerned.
2 I

So based on that, the Court does feel that

3

the motion of the defendant is well taken and would

4

grant the Motion for Summary

5
6
7

Mr. Nielsen, would you prepare the pleadings?
MR. NIELSEN:

THE COURT:

9

MR. THURBER:

11
12
13

May I prepare an Order and

Judgment, your Honor, on the Motion?

8

10

Judgment.

THE COURT:

Yes.
Thank you.
If there are no further questions,

court will be in recess.
(This concludes these proceedings at 10:45 a.m.)
*

* *

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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C E R T I F I C A T E
2 I STATE OF UTAH
I

3
4

)
•

COUNTY OP SALT LAKE

)

I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify

5

that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered

6

Professional Reporter with the Certificate of Merit, and

7

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah.

8
9

That at the time and place of the proceedings
in the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court

10

reporter in the Third Judicial District Court for the

11

Honorable Judge Homer F. Wilkinson, and thereat reported

12

in stenotype all of the proceedings had therein;

13

That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of

14

the Proceedings on the Motion for Summary Judgment were

15

transcribed by computer into the foregoing pages; and

16

that this constitutes a full, true and correct

17

transcript of the same.

18
19

WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 10th day of January, 1991.

20
21
22
23
24
25

My commission expires;
1 April 1991.
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Tab 3

Hay 31, 1984

!GH3 National Corporation
^920 Paradise Road
Las Vegas, Nevada 89119
Gentlemen:
jjpon the closing of the transaction described below, S.N.L.
financial Corporation agrees to pay your company $50,000
cash plus $2,500 a month for fifty (50) consecutive months
Commencing 31 days after closing of the transaction whereby
Security International Insurance Company is acquired by
S.N.L. Financial Corporation. The $50,000 is to be paid
it the closing of said transaction. Such payment shall be
In full satisfaction of any and all claims of any kind or
tature whether arising before or after the date hereof
•gainst S.N.L. Financial Corporation, Security National Life,
Tecurity Holding Corporation, Security International Corporation, Security International Insurance Company, Northwest
•ales Co., George Quist or David Johnson.
this agreement is subject to approval of Mr. Joseph Henroid
If the law firm of Nielson.and Senior of Salt Lake City,
pah, particularly in regard to that certain court order of
jpproximately October, 1983, regarding the divorce of Giles H,
pd Ululani Florence.
•N.L. Financial Corporation

h*
president

RELEASE
I, Giles H. Florence, in consideration of a letter dated
May 31, 1984, from Mr. George R. Quist, President of S.N.L.
Financial Corporation, hereby agree to release and forever
discharge all of the following corporations and persons from
any further liability relating to the matters described in the
letter referred to herein:
S.N.L. Financial Corporation
Security National Life
Security Holding Corporation
Security International Corporation
Security International Insurance Company
Northwest Sales Co.
George R. Quist
David Johnson
This release is given this 31st day of May, 1984.

Giles H. Florence

Tab 4

ANTHONY M. THURBER (#A3261)
Attorney for Plaintiff
8 East Broadway, #735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-0181
IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GILES FLORENCE,

:

Plaintiff,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF GILES FLORENCE

-vs-

:

Civil No. C85-2501

S.N.L. FINANCIAL CORPORATION, :
and GEORGE QUIST,

Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendant.s
Giles Florence being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes
and states:
1. At all times material herein I have held a valid Utah Real
Estate Agent's License authorizing me to derive commissions from
the sale or exchange of real properties for cash or other forms of
consideration.
2.

During the month of April, 1983 I obtained from one David

Johnson of Fargo, North Dakota, an option to buy or sell Mr.
Johnson's 62-1/2% control of Security International Corporation
(SIC), a North Dakota holding company which owned 100%

of the

outstanding stock of Security International Insurance Company
(SIIC), a domestic North Dakota life insurer.

3. On or about April 22, 1983, defendant George Quist for and
in behalf of defendant SNL Financial Corporation executed an
agreement to purchase Mr. Johnson's holdings in SIC for certain
consideration which included as Item 6 a $200,000 annuity in
payment of my commission.

Other terms of that agreement included

the payment of certain amounts of cash, the exchange of certain
real properties, and a premium note in favor of Mr. Johnson; the
consideration totaling approximately $3,570,000 exclusive of my
agreed commission.

Exhibit A attached is a copy of that document

bearing signatures and initials of George Quist as buyer, David
Johnson as seller, and myself as the agent, all confirming and
accepting the terms and conditions therein provided.
4. The agreed commission provided by paragraph 6 thereof was
the agreed consideration for my producing and bringing together a
willing buyer and a willing seller on terms agreeable to each. The
agreement to pay a commission was not and never has been dependent
upon an actual closing.
5.

A refined typewritten agreement between the buyer and

seller was executed during the month of May 1983 and is attached
hereto

as Exhibit B.

By the terms and conditions of that

agreement, all negotiations and "fine tuning" necessary to conclude
a purchase and sale had been completed and agreed upon. All that
remained to be done from that point on was to obtain board approval
from the respective insurance companies and regulatory approval in

2

the state of North Dakota.
6. Subsequent to May 19, 1983, necessary board approvals were
in fact obtained from the involved companies1 respective boards of
directors, and following a hearing on October 26, 1983, the North
Dakota Commissioner of Insurance approved the transaction.
7*

All parties to the transaction, including attorneys for

SNL Financial, David Johnson and myself met in the office of
attorney Kermit Bye at Fargo, North Dakota on May 31, 1984 for the
purpose of closing, as a firm agreement had been made and all
required approvals had been obtained.

Mr. George Quist at that

time and for the first time asserted that it was my responsibility
to pay the costs and attorneys fee incident to the transaction from
my agreed commission of $200,000.

I objected to that new demand

as it was contrary to our agreement of the previous April.

It is

not customary or appropriate for agents to pay such costs and fees.
8.

Following a heated discussion with Mr. Quist and for the

sole purpose of facilitating the closing for which the parties had
traveled to Fargo, I reluctantly agreed to a reduction of $25,0000
in my agreed commission; provided the closing followed immediately
and Mr. Quist insisted upon no additional changes from the signed
agreement.

Mr. Quist and I thereupon executed the documents

attached as Exhibit C, which were prepared by George Quist and
Attorney Scott Quist his son in the office of Mr. Johnson's
attorney Kermit Bye, where we had all met for the closing that day.

3

9.

The agreement dated May 31, 1983 included as a condition

that it was subject to the approval of Joseph L. Henriod, a Salt

Lake City attorney; particularly in regard to that certain court
order of approximately October 1983 regarding the divorce between
myself and my ex-wife Ululani Florence*
10. The subject documents were never submitted to, reviewed,
nor approved by Attorney Joseph Henriod, for the reasons appearing
below.
11.

On June 1, 1984, all the parties including myself again

met in the office of Attorney Kermit Bye in Fargo, North Dakota for
the purpose of finally closing the transaction, as all the terms
and conditions had previously been agreed upon and I had agreed to
a reduction of $25,000 in my commission.

At the commencement of

the meeting, Mr. George Quist called his office in Salt Lake City
to determine whether his company's bank balance was sufficient to
cover the $350,000 down payment required to be made that morning
to

Mr.

David

Johnson,

and

learned

approximately $150,000 deficient.

that

his

balance

was

He thereupon asked Mr. David

Johnson to authorize his company (SIIC) to make up the deficiency;
as both companies would after the transaction become as one. Mr.
Johnson agreed after calling his company to determine its current
bank balance, which was sufficient.

4

12.

Mr. George Quist then surprised all those present by

stating to Mr. David Johnson "you are going to include your
renewals, aren't you"?

The retention of his renewals by Mr.

Johnson was an item which had been negotiated and agreed upon in
writing by the parties as early as May 19, 1983 (See Exhibit B
attached).

The relinquishing of his renewals by Mr. Johnson would

amount to a reduction in the purchase price being paid by the
Quist-SNL contingent by an amount in excess of $1,000,000; and was
a new condition which was totally unacceptable to Mr. Johnson.
13.

Mr. Johnson properly refused to acceed to Mr. Quist!s

new and unexpected demand, and the transaction did not close as
anticipated that day, or ever.

Mr. Johnson thereafter sold his

interests for the same price as had been agreed upon by Mr. Quist
and SNL Financial, without relinquishing his renewals. That sale
involved no commission at all.
14.

The day before we left for the closing in Fargo, North

Dakota, I met: with George Quist and SNL's Attorney Scott Quist in
Salt Lake City at their request to discuss the closing.

They

suggested to me that they planned to "force" David Johnson to
relinquish his renewals because of a deadline set by the Minnesota
Commissioner of Insurance for increasing the capitol of SIIC by
$1,000,000, the deadline being June 6 of the following week. They
indicated that they knew there was no way for Mr. Johnson to raise
the required additional capital than through the proposed sale, for

5

the reason he had not sought out other sources in reliance upon
George Quis t' s committment . They stated they tiioi lg h t Mr J ohnson
would "give in" because of the impending deadline.
When that suggestion was made, I informed the Quists that
ha u e no part in such an attempt to reduce the purchase
price or otherwise change the terms of the purchase agreement in

a n y way,

as all the terms had been fully agreed upon and required

approvals of the respective boards and regulatory authority upon
those terms had been obtained.

I told them I wou] d no t consider

any such attempt to blackmail, and that I would be no part of it.
16.

There was no excuse, legal, equitable, or otherwise, for

the defendan ts failure '

close

transaction upon the agreed

terms June 1, 1984,
17.

I have fully performed the duties of an agent i n bringing

a ready, willing and able buyer and seller together upon mutually
agreeable terms, and in satisfying all the conditions specified by
M r . Quis* .i his April 2 2 , 1983 agreement
18.

The agreed commission was to be paid by George Quist and

Security National Life, and not the seller David Johnson, according
to tlif

u

~ r "" > of the su bject agreement of Mr

April

Qu 1st and SNL dated

1983.
1:?.

To my knowledge M r . Quist never obtained 1: oard appro^ ? a]

of Security National Life or its holding company SNL Financial to
6

change the terms of the agreement with Mr. Johnson which existed
a t the time of closing. Boar: d approval had been obtained upon the
terms originally agreed as they appear in the attached Exhibit B.
It is my understanding and belief that George Quist on his own
initiative demanded the additional, unreasonable, and unacceptable
concession of Mr. Johnson to lower his price by an amount in excess
of $1,000,000 for the purpose of forcing Mi

.lohjison l;n romplete

the transaction at the lower price because of the impending
deadline in Minnesota.
'. I informed David B. Johnson ui April I'M 3, ul my $2 00,000
annuity

commission

agreement

to

be

paid

by

SNL

Financial

Corporation, and that there would be no commission obligation to
me from M.i , Johnson in connection with the transaction.

GILES FLORENCE

VERIFICATION
I have read the foreging affidavit and declare the contents
thereof I:a hr- IIIIH to the best, ol my knowledge, recollection and
belief.

-

^ — .

GILES FLORENCE
7

\

~~

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

ss

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to befoie ne I Ins /&)

day ot May,

1990.
ZOSOIRI

-^
j , «y/
tovr.fr faeion" ^ f*
J]

Expjrss v«w. T 6, 1992

I

JUCiTH VHHRY

NOTARY PUBLIC, residing,
STalt Lake County, Utah

^
l

.'»

l\
3 Has.' 8roaawsy #735
\\tf>
Call Laka City,
U T 34101
\\ ^

V

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a copy of the foregoing
Affidavit, postage prepaid, this *

day ot May, 19 90, to the

following:
Arthur Mielsen
Nielsen & Senior
36 South State Street, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

1

-4^ /^
/
, ^

8

./

\
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CERTIFIED COPY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

GILES FLORENCE,
uxvil No. C85-2501

Plaintiff,

Deposition of:

vs.
S.N-L. FINANCIAL
CORPORATION,

GEORGE QUIST

Defendants.

BE IT REMEMBERED that >ui Thursday, t ht- IHli 'lay
of February, 198 6, commencing at the hour of 10:00 a.m.,
the deposition of GEORGE QUIST, produced as a witness
at tJ:ie i nstai 1 ce and r equest of 11 le P1 a Intif f in the
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named Court,
was taken before me, JILL CROXFORD, a Certified^ Shorthand
Kepox: tei: a nd Notary P u b l i c , in a n d f o r t h e State o f
Utah, at t h e o f f i c e s o f A n t h o n y M. T h u r b e r , 8 East B r o a d w a y ,
Suite 7 3 5 , Salt Lake C i t y , Utah; an<I
T h a t said d e p o s i t i o n w a s t a k e n p u r s u a n t to
Notice.
* * *

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

2

r"

A P P E A R A N C E S
For t h e

Plaintiff:

Anthony M. Thurber
Attorney at Law
Suite 735 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City/Utah 84 — 1

Fo r; t h e

Defendant:

Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys at Law
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 1 1
Scott Quist
Giles Florence

Also Present:

I N D E X
The W i t n e s s

Page

GEORGE QUIST
Examination by Mr, Thurber
* * *

Number
1
2
3
4
5

Description
Letter of 5-19-83
Handwritten Note of 4-1-82
Handwritten Note of 4-22-83
Statement Regarding Acquisition
of Control
Letter of 5-31-84

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 K6ARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

Page
11
15
15
23

29

3

E£0£I5°INGS
GEORGE Q U I S T ,
called as a witness for and on behalf of
the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as foil ows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR, THURBER;
Q. ^

Mr. Quist r would yoi i please state your name

and address for the record.
A

George R. Quist, 4491 Wander Lane, Salt Lake

City, Utah.
Q

How long a time have you resided in the Salt

Lake area?
A

-I was born in Salt Lake County.

Q

So, all your life?

A-

Ne a i: 1 y a 1 1 my 1 1 f e.

Q

What is the nature of your relationship with

S # N . L. Financial Corporation and its affiliates?
A •

I "'iii the president ai id chair inari

of the board.

Q

What, just generally and quickly, is that

company and what are its affiliates?
•

A

Well, it"s a holdii lg company whicht owns

Security National Life and other properties.
Q

Do you hold the same positions i i Ithe

affiliated companies?>
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

7

A

Yes.

Q

H o w w a s M r . Florence compensated for h i s

.nvolvement in it, simply

ri

,

the a c q u i s i t i o n of the loan?

A

I'm not sure I can a n s w e r for M r . F l o r e n c e .

Q

He wasn't paid a finder's fee o r a commissi on

6

froni the Security National Life end o f the t r a n s a c t i o n ,

7

w a s he?

D

A

H e p a i d S e c u r i t y N«"it. i na 1, Life a I ee to make

the C D deposit in t h e bank in W y o m i n g .
10 •

Q

S o , beyond that, you have no k n o w l e d g e of h o w

lie w ";is compensated,

ii -it, il I

12

A

I have no k n o w l e d g e .

1,3

Q

Do y o u recall w h e n It w a s M r . Florence

14

f i rs t came to you wi th a proposal concerning Mr

15

J o h n s o n ' s companies?

David

16

A

A s I r e c a l l , it w a s the spring o f 198 3.

1,7

Q

H o w did' he come to y o u o r h o w dl d he c o m e

18

into contact concerning that m a t t e r ?

]

and come and discuss it?

Did- he call y o u

20

A

Florence contacted m e .

23

Q

Did he come to you d i r e c t l y o r did he come in

22

a "9"ro"i ip o f the o f f i c e r s o f yoi i i < ::onip a n/y a t £ :i i:s t ?

23

'.A

24

Q

26

I think initially, it w a s m y s e l f .
Do you r e c a l l , w a s it face-to-face m e e t i n g o r

d i d y o u learn of the p o s s i b i l i t y o f that a c q u i s i t i o n
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

8
j

:

—

•

•

by telephone?
A

As I recall at the moment, it was from a

telephone call.

1 think he said he was in Arizona•

Did he describe to you what he or what
Mr

Johnson
A

!

::.: :

-ffer?

It may have been the initial contact.

It may

have been in the form of a question.
Wei I , i n a nj event, d id y on learn tha t there
was a holding company and a wholly-owned North Dakota
Domestic Insurance life insurance company available for
acquisition?
^as so informed.
During the ensuing several weeks, were negotiations
undertaken?
• A

Q

Yes.

And was an agreement fina 1 ] y reached and si gned

or initialed outlining the terms of a proposed acquisition?
A

The general terms were.

Q

A rid i s t 1 lat a g r e e m e n t tilii s

the prelimina ry

form of it, what appears on S.N.L. letterhead, three-page
document dated May 19 of 1983?
A'

This was prepared !:c)i Mi

Inlmson.

Q

This document has a number of typewritten

provisions and then a number of handwritten interlineations
and additions.

Do you see that and a number of initials?
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEAflNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

9

A

Yes.

Q

Can you tell me who drafted

t- he agreement,

he typewritten portions of it?
A

I would suspect our joint thinking went Into it

o l ana che actual drafting may have been J eft to o-ur corporate
6 I counsel.
Q

In any events from the fact that - he typewritten

pc

; -. <ijn«-w* appec.i

• nancial

Corporation letterhead, does that suggest to you that it
was prepared within the S.N.L. organization?
A

i:

.Q

]

Now, do you recall a meeting or a series of
• discussed

id agreed upon?

If •

l*

:

meetings at which the changes .-*-•} acid it ion1-, v-.

}^

^

Yeii

A

You would have to enumerate it,

j3e j^^n(:j e n o U g j;i ^ ^ 0

enumerate

vcu would

the changes

e referring

1 to
Changes that I'm asking you about now are

Q

18

i i1d I

L.y h anciwL L 11 en Inter! ineations; in

19

t h o )<

20

several points in this document•

21

were you present when those changes were made?
A

i if.'| »*• t\ r

First, let me ask you,

N( ).

23

Who was, if you know?

/"I

x

J l!i

Were you aware of the terms of the proposal

vu. w ix

u

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEAflNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH

2
3
4
5

GILES FLORENCE,

6
7
8

Plaintiff,
VS.

Civil No. 850902501 CV

S.N.L. FINANCIAL
GEORGE QUIST,

CORPORATION,

9
10

Defendants.

11
12
13
14

D E P O S I T I O N

15

OF

16

DAVID B. JOHNSON

17

April 30, 1990

18

10:00 o'clock,

a.m.

19
20
21

Taken at:
Offices of VOGEL, BRANTNER,
KNUTSON, WEIR & BYE, LTD.
502 First Avenue North
Fargo, North Dakota

KELLY,

22
23
24

REPORTER:

25

LISA SICKLER, RPR
(PURSUANT TO NOTICE)

Box

DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES
3165, Farao. N.D. 5 8 m s
n n m n . n n R

1

A P P E A R A N C E S

2
3
4
5
6

ANTHONY M. THURBER
A t t o r n e y at Law
Suite 735, Judge B u i l d i n g
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
C O U N S E L FOR PLAINTIFF

7
8
9
10
11

A R T H U R H. NIELSEN
Attorney at Law
of
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS

12
Also p r e s e n t :
13

Kermit Bye
Giles F L o r e n c e

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

DOUG KETCHAM & A S S O C I A T E S
Box 3165, Fargo, N . D . 5 8 1 0 8 , (701)

3
1
2
3

I N D E X
PAGE NO.

WITNESS:
DAVID B. JOHNSON

4

Examination

5
6

-

-

By Mr. Thurber

4

Examination

By Mr. Nielsen

69

Cont. Examination

By Mr. Thurber

111

7
8

EXHIBITS

MARKED

9

Deposition Exhibit No. 1

15

10

Deposition Exhibit No. 2

15

11

Deposition Exhibit No. 3

15

12

Deposition Exhibit No. 4

15

13

Deposition Exhibit No. 5

15

14

Deposition Exhibit No. 6

15

15

Deposition Exhibit No. 7

15

16

Deposition Exhibit No. 8

111

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES
Box 3165, Fargo, N.D. 58108, (701)237-0275

4
1

WHEREUPON,

2
3

the following proceedings were had,
to-wit:

4

DAVID B. JOHNSON, a witness, called

5

by the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn,

6

testified on his oath as follows:

7

BY MR. THURBER

8

Q.

9

EXAMINATION

Will you state your full name and

your address for the record please, Mr.

10

Johnson?

11

A.

My name is David, middle initial

12

B. Johnson.

13

Fargo, North Dakota, 58104.

14

Q.

My address is Route 1, Box 391,

Will you review for us just

15

briefly the nature of your educational

16

background and experience?

17

A.

I'm a graduate of North Dakota

18

State University.

19

business administration at Stanford

20

University and the University of Minnesota.

21
22
23
24
25

Q.

I took graduate work in

How long a time have you resided

in this area, that is, the Fargo area?
A.

I have lived in Fargo since I

believe in 1960.
Q.

Will you tell us how and when you

DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES
Box 3165, Fargo, N.D. 58108, (7 01)23 7-0275

24
1
2

A*

if you want me to.

3
4

Well, I'll read off the document

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

Well, read us

what it says.

5

A.

Point 6 there's a figure of, Point

6

6, $200,000 and then the next word that I can

7

read says annuity and I can't read the rest

8

of it*

9

Q*

Okay.

Do you know what that

—

10

let me ask you first, did the proposal of the

11

Quists to you involve that $200,000 annuity

12

to you or to anyone in your family?

13

A.

No.

I really knew nothing about

14

it up to —

15

this document that there was a request, the

16

request of a $200,000 annuity.

17

than that I was not to receive anything of

18

that.

19
20

Q.

I certainly knew when I signed

But other

Do you know who was to be the

beneficiary of that if anyone?

21

MR. NIELSEN:

22

Speculative.

23

know.

24

A.

25

by an annuity.

Objection.

This person would never

Giles.

He was to be compensated

DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES
Box 3165, Fargo, N.D. 58108, (7 01)23 7-0275

53
1

conversation with reference to renewals*

2

renewals had ever come up where I was to give

3

up any of my renewals, the negotiation would

4

have ceased at that time.

5

Qc

If

Had there been any discussion or

6

suggestion from the Quist side of the table

7

that any of the terms and conditions

a

reflected by Exhibit 4 be changed, be

9

materially changed or changed at all from May

10

of '83 until this meeting on June 1 of 1984?

11

A*

No.

Other than the fine tuning

12

that you see depicted on the various sheets

13

of paper.

14

Q.

Were you ready, willing and able

15

to close on those terms, namely, the May 1983

16

terms on the morning of June 1, 1984?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Qe

Was there any other reason for the

19

meeting than to close?

20

A.

Not that I know of.

21

Q.

All right.

After the discussion

22

that you've related about the down payment of

23

$350,000 was concluded, tell us what happened

24

next.

25

A.

Well, George stated that they had

DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES
Box 3165, Fargo, N.D. 58108, (7 01)23 7-027 5

D4

1

no intention of paying me the renewals and

2

basically that was the end of the

3

discussion*

4

they'd change their mind and really nothing

5

happened after that date.

6

any communication with them after they left

7

on the 1st.

8
9
10
11

Q.

I left my mind open to see if

I don't recall

Was that the first discussion that

had been made to you about relinquishing your
renewals?*
A.

It's the only time that renewals

12

were mentioned that I was going to forfeit my

13

renewals.

14

have never proceeded with another matter with

15

the Quists had that ever come up prior to the

16

closing date of June 1 of '84.

17

Q.

Like I said a moment ago, I would

In terms of volume or in terms of

18

dollars in this transaction what difference

19

would have been made had you relinquished

20

your renewals?

21

A.

Well, I'm going to estimate that

22

my renewals at that time would have been

23

running between 5 and 10,000 a month.

24

so you're talking a very significant amount

25

of money over the years and it could be in

And
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1
2

the range of or close to a million dollars.
Q.

And would the bottom line effect

3

of relinquishing renewals had you done so at

4

Mr. Quist's request been to reduce his cost

5

of acquisition by that amount?

6
7
8
9
10
11

MR. NIELSEN:
of the question.
A^

Leading and suggestive.

Over the period it would have been

reduced by the amount of the renewals.
Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

And was that

something acceptable to you?

12
13

I object to the form

MR. NIELSEN:
A.

Same objection.

I had stated twice during the

14

deposition that I would have absolutely

15

refused to negotiate any further with the

16

Quists had the subject of renewals and my

17

forfeiture of the renewals against the

18

purchase price ever come up.

19

basically wasted one year in this, in the

20

matter of negotiations.

21

Q.

I feel that we

I'm going to read to you just a

22

couple of statements by Mr. Scott Quist in

23

his deposition which appear at pages 13 and

24

14 and just ask you to, for your

25

observations.

At page 14 Mr. Quist makes
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1

the statement relating to your demands as of

2

June 1, 1984.

3

dramatic changes.

4

your demands -- "were specifically not agreed

5

to in the forme, not contained in the forme."

6

Can you comment on that statement?

7

MR. NIELSEN:

8
9

That they were "all very

of the question.
Q.

And that they" —

meaning

I object to the form

No proper foundation.

(BY MR. THURBER)

Well, let me ask

10

it this way.

Were there any dramatic, what

11

could be remotely termed dramatic changes in

12

your position as of June 1, 1984?

13

A.

None whatsoever.

14

Q.

Dramatic or otherwise?

15

A.

That is correct.

16

Q.

Would there be any truth to the

17

notion or the statement that from the point

18

of your demands or your position the "basic

19

structure had changed"?

20

A.

21
22
23
24
25

No.
MR. NIELSEN:

I object to that on

the same grounds.
Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

Or that your

terms were "radically different"?
A.

That statement is utterly
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1

ridiculous.

2

Q.

Or that your position as of June

3

1, 1984 bore no resemblance to the May

4

1983 --

5

MR- NIELSEN:

Same objection.

6

A.

Again utterly ridiculous.

7

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

Specifically had

8

any of your terms changed regarding or your

9

demands changed as of June 1, 1984 regarding

10

any of the following matters, first, the

11

manner or the amount of the consideration to

12

be paid to you?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Secondly, the premium note

15

provided by the agreement being contingent or

16

fixed, that is the payment pursuant to the

17

premium note being contingent or fixed?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Third, the continuation, matter of

20

continuation of presidental compensation to

21

you?

22

A*

All I received from the company

23

other than in the formative years after 1963

24

were commissions for running the company and

25

being responsible for virtually all of the
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1

sales.

2

compensation was under a different caption.

3

At no time have I ever been paid a salary per

4

se as a president or in any other capacity.

5

My commissions were at one standard or fixed

6

rate and they continued.

7
8
9

And at one time some of the

Q.

Fourth, the maintenance of agents

office facilities?
A.

During our Denver meeting I had

10

suggested to George Quist that he consider

11

continuing paying our agency director of a

12

salary for a, for a possible year as a means

13

of simplifying this change of ownership.

14

Mr. Davidson at the time knew virtually all

15

of the stockholders and all of the policy

16

holders, and in order to pacify and work with

17

these people and to assure him of the merits

18

of the merger, I thought it would be to the

19

company's advantage to be supportive of Mr.

20

Davidson.

21

not a demand or even a request.

22

Q.

But that was only a suggestion,

And, fifth, the provision or the

23

supplying of banks for the agents to solicit

24

from which the agents might solicit bank

25

business after the transaction?
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1

A.

If you'll refer to Mr. Quist's

2

original offers, they agreed to set up the

3

banks at their expense.

4

negotiations they offered Northwest Sales

5

Company an additional commission rate I

6

believe of 5 percent if we would take on that

7

responsibility of signing up the banks, but

8

originally that was to be their job.

9

statement is again completely false.

10

Q*

Later on in the

So that

Were there any terms reflected by

11

either the forme submission of Scott Quist

12

dated September 28, 1983 or the letter

13

agreement and interlineated and initialed May

14

19, 1983 that were not totally acceptable to

15

you on June 1, 1984?

16
17

MR. NIELSEN:

Object to the form

of the question.

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Did you ever either orally or in

22

Your answer?

writing either suggest any different terms?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Did you ever request of the

25

Quists, either of them, that Giles not be
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1

contacted about any aspect of this

2

transaction?

3

A.

Would you repeat that?

4

Q^

Did you ever request of the Quists

5

that Giles Florence not be contacted

6

concerning any aspect of this transaction?

7

MR. NIELSEN:

Same objection.

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

Did you ever

10

suggest to the Quists that you didn't want to

11

deal with Mr. Florence?

12

A.

13
14

No.
MR. NIELSEN:

Q.

Same objection.

(BY MR. THURBER)

As of June 1,

15

1984 had Mr. Florence done all that you

16

wanted or expected of him?

17

MR. NIELSEN:

Same objection.

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

Was there

20

anything remaining to be done in what Giles

21

Florence had been undertaking to do?

22

MR. NIELSEN:

Same objection.

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

25

Was Mr. Q u i s t s

demand on the morning of June 1, 1984
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1

something you would describe or not describe

2

as a radical change in the agreement?

3

MR. NIELSEN:

4

A.

Absolutely.

Same objection.
And I refer to my

5

former answers, had that ever come up that

6

the negotiations would have stopped at that

7

point-

8

unacceptable from the very beginning, from

9

the very mention of giving up of the

10

It would have been totally

renewals.

11

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

Do you know why

12

Mr. Quist inserted that demand into this

13

transaction on that date?

14

MR. NIELSEN:

15
16

A.

Same objection.

I don't know why he did that.

I

can refer to one passing thought --

17

MR. NIELSEN:

Let me interject

18

here.

19

Mr. Johnson.

20

comment to Mr. Johnson which Mr. Johnson

21

apparently is now going to interject in his

22

testimony and I object to it and I object to

23

the fact that he has also done this before.

24
25

Apparently Mr. Florence is coaching

Q.

Mr. Florence just made a

(BY MR. THURBER)

Okay.

We only

want you to testify from your own
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1

recollection.

2

A.

No.

I realize that Giles said

3

something, but I also related to you earlier

4

this morning that I have no hearing in my

5

right ear and my left eardrum was shot out by

6

the Shriners during an initiation and so I

7

have a great difficulty hearing.

S

the word Minnesota.

9

I did hear

And I'll refer back to my sheet

10

that gives the date of the Florence matter on

11

5-4-84, and this had been referred to and

12

discussed prior to this moment, that I called

13

Giles Florence on that date and he stated, it

14

says here, states George Quist trying to make

15

distress buy of Security

16

Insurance Company due to the Minnesota

17

capital and surplus problem.

18

International

But I had no, no idea other than

19

an assumption that this could have some part

20

of why George Quist came in at the last

21

minute and tried to renegotiate the price

22

based on the forfeiture of my renewals other

23

than to try to beat down the price assuming

24

that we're under pressure to act because of

25

the Minnesota situation.

And I can assure
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1

you that that tactic would never work with me

2

because we could have forfeited Minnesota

3

from that standpoint plus I had other means

4

of raising that money.

5

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

Can you identify

6

for us anything other than this new demand of

7

Mr. Quist's that morning of June 1 that

8

caused this transaction to fail, anything

9

else?

10

MR. NIELSEN:

I object to it on

11

the form of the question and calls for a

12

speculative answer of the witness.

13

A.

No.

14

.Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

15
16

Was that the end

of the discussion with Mr. Quist?
A.

Well, I know on that date that

17

Quist also had an appointment with Basil

18

Walker on 6-1 of '84 and that he went over

19

and met with him at the Townhouse, had lunch

20

over there at the Townhouse.

21

Q.

Was that before or after this?

22

A.

This would have been after the

23

meeting in the morning.

24

been at noon.

25

Q.

Yes, it would have

Did the transaction go any
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1

further?

2

A.

3

again after this time*

4
5

Well, I never heard from them

Q.

After June 1 what happened with

regard to the sale of your position?

6

A,

Well, I communicated with actuary

7

Mr. Bill Buchanan and he apparently

8

a

suggested

—

9

MR. NIELSEN:

I object to any

10

conversations with somebody else on the

11

grounds that it's hearsay.

12
13

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

You can tell us

what you did.

14

A.

Well, I talked to Mr. Buchanan and

15

he apparently suggested that a fellow, one of

16

his clients come up and view and examine

17

Security International and this gentleman

18

ultimately did come up here.

19

it.

20
21
22

Q.

So that was

Was a sale on the same or similar

terms as the Quist agreement negotiated?
A.

Yes.

On 10-10, 1984 we concluded

23

the sale of our controlling interest in

24

Security International Corporation and

25

insurance company to another party, yes.
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1

Q.

And was it on the same or

2

different terms to which you agreed with Mr,

3

Quist?

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

A.

It was on the, I would say almost

identical terms.
Q.

And what if anything was done with

regard to your renewals in that transaction?
A.

I continue to receive my renewals

and I continue to receive them to this date.
Q.

Was there any suggestion made at

11

the closing of that transaction that you

12

relinquish your renewals?

13

A*

No.

14

Q.

And who was the buyer?

15

A*

The buyer was American Insurance

16

Management Company, Incorporated out of

17

Phoenix, Arizona.

18

Q.

Were those same terms acceptable

19

to you both before and after the June 1, 1984

20

meeting with Mr. Quist?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

From your standpoint as a party to

23

this transaction had Mr. Giles performed

24

totally what he'd undertaken to perform?

25

MR. NIELSEN:

Same objection.
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1

It's leading and suggestive and calls for a

2

conclusion.

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

5

anything more for him to do?

6
7

A»

There was nothing more that I knew

Q*

Had he produced a ready and able

of.

8
9

buyer?

10

MR. NIELSEN:

Same objection.

11

A*

Yes.

12

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

13

Was there

On terms

acceptable to you?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q»

Was there anything more that a

16

broker or a finder is required to do?

17

MR. NIELSEN:

Same objection.

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

(BY MR. THURBER)

From your point

20

of view was there an enforceable agreement

21

with

—

22

MR. NIELSEN:

Same

—

23

MR. THURBER:

Let me finish the

24

question, please.

Was there an enforceable

25

agreement with the Quist interest as of June
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STATEMENT REGARDING THE ACQUISITION OF CONTROL
OF A DOESTIC INSURER

Security International Insurance Company

By

S.N.L. Financial Corporation

Filed with the Insurance Department of North Dakota

Dated September 28, 1983

Correspondence concerning this statement should be addressed to:

Scott M. Quist, Esq.
General Counsel
S.N.L. Financial Corporation
P.O. Box 9249
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-0249
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failure to comply in any way with or perform any term, covenant or
condition of this Agreement or any related agreement, docunent or
instrument executed or to be executed pursuant to or in connection with
this Agreement; (c) the inaccuracy of any certificates to be supplied by
any officer of Security Holding pursuant to this Agreement.
14.3 Special Provisions As a condition precedent to the right to
receive any indemnification hereunder, the party seeking indemnification
shall give the indemnitor prompt written notice of any event which might
give rise to a claim from indemnification specifying the nature of the
possible claim and the amount believed to be involved. If the claim for
indemnification arises from a claim or dispute with any third party, the
indemnitor shall have the right, at its own expense, to defend such claims
or disputes and the indemnified party shall cooperate with the indemnitor
in such defense. The indemnitor shall reimburse the indemnified party at
any time after the Closing, based on the judgment of any court of competent
jurisdiction or pursuant to a bona fide compromise or settlement or claims,
demands or actions In respect of any damages to which the indemnification
hereinabove set forth relates.
SECTION FIFTEEN
Commissions and Flndersy Fees
Finder SIC and Security Holding agree that Mr. Giles Florence of
Phoenix, Arizona, has acted as a finder In connection with the transactions
contemplated herein and that no other party will serve as a finder. The
parties agree that their respective expenses Incurred and to be Incurred In
connection with the transactions contemplated hereby, including without
limitation, attorneys1 fees, accountants'* fees, travel, printing, mailing
and postage, shall be deducted from the fee of Mr. Florence.

SECTION SIXTEEN
Plan of Dissolution and Liquidation
It Is the intention of the parties hereto that this Agreement and the
transactions set forth herein be considered a purchase and liquidation
within the meaning of Sections 338 and 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as amended.
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